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近日，我院助理教授王鹏通讯作者的论文“Input, output or mixed monitoring in teams?”（合作者:Parimal K. Bag）被国际期刊Journalof Economic Behavior and Organization (SSCI二区) 接受发表。
Abstract:
Inteam problems is it better for the principal to reward players based on theirindividual efforts or should they be rewarded based on collective performanceor even a combination of the two? The answer will depend on the importance oftwo familiar challenges in team works – coordination and free riding. Withperfectly complementary efforts, free-riding incentives are absent, so theprincipal prefers output monitoring over input monitoring but sometimes bothmay be dominated by mixed-wage incentives. When efforts are perfect substitutesin production, either of the two polar mechanisms may dominate the other butsometimes mixed-wages may dominate both. For more general technologies onlyoutput and input monitoring mechanisms are compared. It is shown that when theteam production technology is supermodular, coordination becomes the primaryconcern and monitoring agents through collective output is mostly the betterprotocol. On the other hand, if the technology is submodular, output monitoringencourages free riding and so input monitoring may be a more attractivealternative.
王鹏，博士，新加坡国立大学
研究领域：应用微观理论，公共经济学，博弈论
